

Assignment 5**Due date: December 3, 2015**

1. **Correcting errors at known positions [12 points; 3 each].** Here we consider error correcting codes for scenarios where, after the qubits have been transmitted, the location of the possible error is known (but not the error itself). Consider the 4-qubit quantum error correcting Code A with basis codewords

$$|c_0\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|0000\rangle + |1111\rangle) \quad (1)$$

$$|c_1\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|0011\rangle + |1100\rangle). \quad (2)$$

A qubit $\alpha|0\rangle + \beta|1\rangle$ is encoded as $\alpha|c_0\rangle + \beta|c_1\rangle$. This code does not protect against an arbitrary one-qubit error as the 9-qubit Shor code does. However, if, after the transmission of the codeword, we are given $k \in \{1, 2, 3, 4\}$ which is *the location* of the (potential) error but not the error itself then it is possible to correct it. For example, if $k = 3$ then we can assume that we received a state of the form $(I \otimes I \otimes U \otimes I)(\alpha|c_0\rangle + \beta|c_1\rangle)$ but we don't know what U (the error on qubit 3) is. Our goal is to recover $\alpha|c_0\rangle + \beta|c_1\rangle$ from this.

- Show how Code A (described above) protects against I and X errors of known location. In other words, along with the four qubits, we are given $k \in \{1, 2, 3, 4\}$ and either I or X has been applied to the k^{th} qubit received (but we don't know which one). Show how to undo the error in this scenario. By the symmetry of $|c_0\rangle$ and $|c_1\rangle$, you may simply show how to undo the error in the case where $k = 4$; the other three cases would be very similar to explain.
- Consider Code B, with basis codewords, $|c'_0\rangle = H^{\otimes 4}|c_0\rangle$ and $|c'_1\rangle = H^{\otimes 4}|c_1\rangle$, where $\alpha|0\rangle + \beta|1\rangle$ is encoded as $\alpha|c'_0\rangle + \beta|c'_1\rangle$. Show how Code B protects against I and Z errors (in the same sense that Code A does in part (a)). (Hint: You may use the result in part (a) and the fact that $HZH = X$, but your explanation must be clear.)
- Show how Code A protects against I , X , Z , and XZ errors of known location. (Hint: make use of the results established in parts (a) and (b).)
- Show how Code A protects against any one-qubit unitary U error of known location. You may use the results from parts (a), (b) and (c) here.

Optional for bonus credit [5 points]:

- Prove that there exists no 4-qubit code (where the data encoded is one qubit) that can protect against *two* errors of known location.

2. **Searching when the fraction of marked items is 1/4 and 1/2 [12 points; 6 each].**

- Suppose that $f : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ has the property that, for exactly $\frac{1}{4}2^n$ of the values of $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$, $f(x) = 1$ and the goal is to find such an x . Show how to do this with a single query to f . (Hint: consider a single iteration of Grover's algorithm.)
- Same question as part (a), except assume that f has the property that for exactly $\frac{1}{2}2^n$ of the values of $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$, $f(x) = 1$. Can the x still be found with one query?

3. **A nonlocal game [12 points; 6 each].** Consider the game where Alice and Bob are physically separated and their goal is to produce outputs that satisfy the winning conditions specified below. Alice and Bob receive $s, t \in \{0, 1, 2\}$ as input (s to Alice and t to Bob), at which point they are forbidden from communicating with each other (so Alice has no idea what t is and Bob has no idea what s is). They each output a bit, a for Alice and b for Bob. The winning conditions are:

- $a = b$ in the cases where $s = t$.
- $a \neq b$ in the cases where $s \neq t$.

- (a) Show that any classical strategy (that uses no quantum information) of Alice and Bob that always succeeds in the $s = t$ cases can succeed with probability at most $2/3$ in the $s \neq t$ cases.
- (b) Give a quantum strategy (that is, one where Alice and Bob can create an entangled state before the game starts and then base their outcomes on their measurements of their parts of this state) that always succeeds in the $s = t$ cases and succeeds with probability $3/4$ in the $s \neq t$ cases. (Hint: try the entangled state $\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}|00\rangle - \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}|11\rangle$ and have Alice and Bob perform rotations depending on s and t respectively.)

4. **Secret key encryption for qubits [12 points; 6 each].** Recall the classical *one-time pad* encryption scheme restricted to a single bit. Alice wants to send a bit of information to Bob over a channel that is possibly being monitored by (eavesdropper) Eve. Alice and Bob share a secret key, which was set up in advance. The secret key is a randomly chosen (uniformly distributed) $k \in \{0, 1\}$, which is known by Alice and Bob, but—importantly—not by Eve. If Alice wants to send a bit m to Bob then Alice computes $c = m \oplus k$ and sends c over the channel. When Bob receives c , he computes $m' = c \oplus k$. It is easy to show that $m' = m$ and Eve acquires no information about m from looking at c .

Here, we consider a similar scenario, but where Alice wants to send a qubit $|\psi\rangle$ to Bob over a quantum channel that is possibly being monitored by Eve. How can this be accomplished so that if Eve performs a measurement on the data that goes through the channel, she cannot acquire any information about what $|\psi\rangle$ was?

- (a) If Alice and Bob share a classical secret key bit $k \in \{0, 1\}$, then one approach is for Alice to send $X^k|\psi\rangle$ to Bob. This seems analogous to the classical protocol: Alice flips or doesn't flip according to the key bit. Show that this is highly insecure by giving two quantum states $|\psi_0\rangle$ and $|\psi_1\rangle$ whose encryptions Eve can perfectly distinguish.
- (b) Suppose that Alice and Bob have two (independently generated) key bits k_1, k_2 , and Alice encrypts $|\psi\rangle$ as the state $Z^{k_1}X^{k_2}|\psi\rangle$. (Note that Bob can decrypt this since he has k_1 and k_2 .) Show that this is perfectly secure. For the purposes of this question, you may prove this by showing that the scheme has the following property: for any two pure states $|\psi_0\rangle$ and $|\psi_1\rangle$, if Alice is encrypting either $|\psi_0\rangle$ or $|\psi_1\rangle$ and Eve can perform any measurement on the encrypted data, then Eve cannot distinguish between the two cases with probability better than $\frac{1}{2}$.

5. **Distributed testing of $|00\rangle + |11\rangle$ states [12 points; 6 each].** Consider the scenario that arises in the Lo-Chau cryptosystem, where Alice and Bob share a two-qubit state and they want to test if it is $|\phi^+\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|00\rangle + |11\rangle)$ with local measurements and classical communication.

We consider the following procedure. They randomly select a measurement basis: with probability $\frac{1}{2}$, they both measure in the computational basis; and, with probability $\frac{1}{2}$, they both measure in the Hadamard basis. Then they perform the measurement and they accept if and only if their outcomes are the same.

- (a) Show that the state $|\phi^+\rangle$ is always (i.e., with probability 1) accepted by this test.
- (b) Show that $|\phi^+\rangle$ is the *only* state that this test accepts with probability 1.