

### Assignment 5

**Due date: November 26, 2013**

1. **A nonlocal game.** Consider the game where Alice and Bob are physically separated and their goal is to produce outputs that satisfy the winning conditions specified below. Alice and Bob receive  $s, t \in \{0, 1, 2\}$  as input ( $s$  to Alice and  $t$  to Bob), at which point they are forbidden from communicating with each other (so Alice has no idea what  $t$  is and Bob has no idea what  $s$  is). They each output a bit,  $a$  for Alice and  $b$  for Bob. The winning conditions are:
  - $a = b$  in the cases where  $s = t$ .
  - $a \neq b$  in the cases where  $s \neq t$ .
  - (a) Show that any classical strategy (that uses no quantum information) of Alice and Bob that always succeeds in the  $s = t$  cases can succeed with probability at most  $2/3$  in the  $s \neq t$  cases.
  - (b) Give a quantum strategy (that is, one where Alice and Bob can create an entangled state before the game starts and then base their outcomes on their measurements of their parts of this state) that always succeeds in the  $s = t$  cases and succeeds with probability  $3/4$  in the  $s \neq t$  cases. (Hint: try the entangled state  $\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}|00\rangle - \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}|11\rangle$  and have Alice and Bob perform rotations depending on  $s$  and  $t$  respectively.)
  
2. **Secret key encryption.** Recall the classical *one-time pad* encryption scheme restricted to a single bit. The scenario is that Alice wants to send a bit of information to Bob over a channel that is possibly being monitored by Eve (an eavesdropper). We assume that Alice and Bob share a secret key, which was set up in advance. The secret key is a randomly chosen (uniformly distributed)  $k \in \{0, 1\}$ , which is known by Alice and Bob, but—importantly—not by Eve. If Alice wants to send a bit  $m$  to Bob then Alice computes  $c = m \oplus k$  and sends  $c$  over the channel. When Bob receives  $c$ , he computes  $m' = c \oplus k$ . It is easy to show that  $m' = m$  and Eve acquires no information about  $m$  from looking at  $c$ . We now consider a similar scenario, but where Alice wants to send a qubit  $|\psi\rangle$  to Bob over a quantum channel that is possibly being monitored by Eve. How can this be accomplished so that if Eve performs a measurement on the data that goes through the channel, she cannot acquire any information about what  $|\psi\rangle$  was?
  - (a) If Alice and Bob share a classical secret key bit  $k \in \{0, 1\}$ , then one approach would be for Alice to send  $X^k|\psi\rangle$  to Bob. This seems analogous to the classical protocol: Alice either flips or doesn't flip the (qu)bit according to a random key bit. Show that this is highly insecure by giving two quantum states  $|\psi_0\rangle$  and  $|\psi_1\rangle$  whose encryptions Eve can perfectly distinguish between.
  - (b) Suppose that Alice and Bob have two (independently generated) key bits  $k_1, k_2$ , and Alice encrypts  $|\psi\rangle$   $Z^{k_1}X^{k_2}|\psi\rangle$ . (Note that Bob can decrypt this since he has  $k_1$  and  $k_2$ .) Show that this is perfectly secure in the sense that, for any two quantum states  $|\psi_0\rangle$  and  $|\psi_1\rangle$ , Eve cannot distinguish *at all* between their encryptions.

3. **Correcting errors at known positions.** Here we consider error correcting codes in scenarios where, after the qubits have been transmitted, the location of the possible error is known (but not the error itself). Consider the 4-qubit quantum error correcting Code A, which uses basis codewords  $|c_0\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|0000\rangle + |1111\rangle)$  and  $|c_1\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|0011\rangle + |1100\rangle)$ . A qubit  $\alpha|0\rangle + \beta|1\rangle$  is encoded as  $\alpha|c_0\rangle + \beta|c_1\rangle$ . It is easy to construct a quantum circuit that performs this encoding, but we are more interested in the error-correcting capabilities of this code. This code does not protect against an arbitrary one-qubit error as the 9-qubit Shor code does. However, if, after the transmission of the codeword, we are given  $k \in \{1, 2, 3, 4\}$  which is *the location* of the (potential) error but not the error itself then it is possible to correct it. For example, if  $k = 3$  then we can assume that we received a state of the form  $(I \otimes I \otimes U \otimes I)(\alpha|c_0\rangle + \beta|c_1\rangle)$  but we don't know what  $U$  (the error on qubit 3) is. Our goal is to recover  $\alpha|c_0\rangle + \beta|c_1\rangle$  from this.

- (a) Show how Code A (described above) protects against  $I$  and  $X$  errors of known location. In other words, along with the four qubits, we are given  $k \in \{1, 2, 3, 4\}$  and either  $I$  or  $X$  has been applied to the  $k^{\text{th}}$  qubit received (but we don't know which one). Show how to undo the error in this scenario. By the symmetry of  $|c_0\rangle$  and  $|c_1\rangle$ , you may simply show how to undo the error in the case where  $k = 4$ ; the other three cases would be very similar to explain.
- (b) Consider Code B, whose basis codewords are  $|c'_0\rangle = H^{\otimes 4}|c_0\rangle$  and  $|c'_1\rangle = H^{\otimes 4}|c_1\rangle$ . A qubit  $\alpha|0\rangle + \beta|1\rangle$  is encoded as  $\alpha|c'_0\rangle + \beta|c'_1\rangle$ .
  - i. Give explicit expressions for  $|c'_0\rangle$  and  $|c'_1\rangle$ .
  - ii. Show how Code B protects against  $I$  and  $X$  errors (in the same sense that Code A does in part (a)).
- (c) Show how Code A protects against  $I$ ,  $X$ ,  $Z$ , and  $XZ$  errors of known location. (Hint: make use of the results established in parts (a) and (b).)
- (d) Show how Code A protects against any one-qubit unitary  $U$  error of known location. You may use the results from parts (a), (b) and (c) here.

4. **Searching when the density of marked items is  $1/4$  and  $1/2$ .**

- (a) Suppose that  $f : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$  has the property that for exactly  $\frac{1}{4}2^n$  of the values of  $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$ ,  $f(x) = 1$  and the goal is to find such an  $x$ . Show that Grover's algorithm is guaranteed to find such an  $x$  after a single iteration (and thus with a single query to  $U_f$ ).
- (b) The same question as part (a), except assume that  $f$  has the property that for exactly  $\frac{1}{2}2^n$  of the values of  $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$ ,  $f(x) = 1$ . Can such an  $x$  still be found with a single query to  $U_f$ ?

5. **Unitary that always maps every state to an orthogonal state?** Is there a one-qubit unitary operation that maps each pure state  $|\psi\rangle$  to some state  $|\psi'\rangle$  such that  $\langle\psi|\psi'\rangle = 0$ ? If so, specify the unitary operation. If not, prove that no such unitary operation exists.

6. **Optional for bonus credit: Is the transpose a valid quantum operation?** Here we consider an operation on qubits that we denote by  $\Lambda$ , defined as  $\Lambda(\rho) = \rho^T$  for each density matrix  $\rho$  (where  $\rho^T$  is the transpose of  $\rho$ ).
- (a) Give an example of a one-qubit pure state  $|\psi\rangle$  such that  $\Lambda(|\psi\rangle\langle\psi|)$  is a pure state orthogonal to  $|\psi\rangle$ .
  - (b) Prove that there is no unitary operation  $U$  such that  $\Lambda(\rho) = U\rho U^\dagger$  for all  $\rho$ .